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MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND GOVERNMENT CONTROLS ON 
OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. AND U.K. IN THE 
1960s 
 
“Companies outgrow countries: A new kind of economic animal –mastodons of the 
future? – is displacing growing weight throughout the world economy”, The 
Economist, 17th October 1964.1  
 
Like The Economist, many social scientists have presented the growth of 
multinational enterprise and related changes in the global economy since the Second 
World War as novel and transformative.2 Business historians have rightly been highly 
critical of much of such work – be it on globalisation, the internationalisation of 
business or the consequences for national governments, for the lack of an historical 
perspective. They have been highly successful in highlighting the historical 
continuities associated with such “new” developments.3 It is now commonplace to 
accept the notion of waves of globalisation and the existence of large multinationals 
prior to the Second World War. This corrective has been important in contextualising 
these more recent developments and in illustrating continuities.  
However, business historians are yet to have the same influence on our 
understanding of the post-war era itself, the period of the classic multinational 
enterprise. It was at this time that the roots of the new global economy, which came to 
fruition in the 1980s and 1990s, took hold.4 Geoffrey Jones has commented on our 
lack of knowledge about British multinationals after 1945.5 On the U.S. Mira 
Wilkins’ seminal work on The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise covers the period 
to 1970 but noted, “Only when corporate and Department of State archives are open 
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for the late 1950s and 1960s will we be able to evaluate the full impact of U.S. foreign 
policies on U.S. private enterprise abroad.”6 She continues, “In the late 1950s and 
1960s (as in times past), U.S. government policies had both positive and negative 
effects on the operations of U.S. multinational business. On the surface – and the 
historian is stymied because the archival material is not yet available – the impact of 
U.S. governmental activities in recent years appears to have been greater than in the 
earlier periods of American history – reflecting the generally enlarged role of the U.S. 
government and U.S. business in both the international and domestic economies.”7 
Over three and a half decades later, it now seems timely to re-examine the topic in the 
light of the archival material now available. 
This seems appropriate not just because it is timely but also because of her 
conclusion that the impact of government on business appeared greater than in the 
past. This is striking because it is potentially at odds with the characterisation of the 
relationship between multinationals and nation-states which emerged in the light of 
the experience of the 1960s as one of nation-states’ “sovereignty at bay.” 8 As 
Stephen Kobrin has argued recently, Raymond Vernon, in coining the phrase, was 
looking for dramatic effect (with success) but, nevertheless, believed that nation-sta
faced a loss of autonomy and control as a result of the internationalisation of 
production in the 1960s.
tes 
 a threat to 
ase to case. 
9 Using archival material should allow us to draw out more 
precisely the nature of the tension between multinational enterprises and national 
governments in this period. It is shown here that in general there was a clear division 
in attitudes between business and government but that this did not represent
national governments’ sovereignty. Moreover, the basis of the tension between 
business and government varied from c
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Equally, Wilkins reminds us that, whilst much of the literature (following 
Vernon’s lead) on this tension has focussed on that between American multinationals 
and the host nation governments, much of the original debate instead concentrated on 
the relationship with the home American government.10 For in the 1960s the US 
economy experienced a balance of payments problem to which the Kennedy, Johnson 
and Nixon administrations all responded by restricting capital outflows, including 
measures to restrict foreign direct investment (FDI) by American multinationals. The 
impact of these measures was hotly disputed at the time and reflected different 
conceptions of how multinational business operated and its contribution to the 
American economy. 11 
This was a debate about American multinationals and American government 
carried on by American scholars.12 There was little attempt to examine experience 
elsewhere. Yet, just as business historians have shown that this experience was not 
new, so this article argues that this tension was not a uniquely American experience at 
this time, rather this was a wider phenomenon even in the 1960s. This is done by 
comparing the American experience with that in Britain, where many of the same 
issues were being played out contemporaneously. Just as in the US, controls over 
outward direct investment by British companies trying to internationalise their 
production were tightened by the British government to deal with a balance of 
payments problem and the similarities in experience and attitudes illustrated both by 
government and by business towards multinational enterprise in the two cases is 
striking. 
The article begins by setting out the respective contexts in the two countries 
before summarizing the nature of the government policies introduced. It then draws 
out the similarities between the two cases, in terms of impact, government attitudes 
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and business attitudes. Finally, the conclusion not only considers the findings drawn 
out by the comparative approach but returns to Mira Wilkins’ contention of the 
impact of national governments on multinational enterprise in this period and makes 
some comments about the ways in which archival material has added to our 
understanding of this subject. 
 
US and UK in the 1960s 
As already noted, the rise of multinational enterprise after the Second World War was 
an overwhelmingly American experience. At the time it was often seen as a peculiarly 
American experience.13 The resulting theories of multinational enterprise, developed 
largely by American scholars, were based on this American experience.14 In many 
respects, this was clearly justified: by the late 1960s over 50 per cent of the world’s 
stock of FDI was American and, even more starkly, so was 85 per cent of all new FDI 
outflows since the end of the Second World War.15 Why then adopt a comparative 
perspective? The answer is that despite the many works which appeared at the time 
studying the relationship between American multinational enterprise and the 
American economy, when considering the impact of multinational enterprise on the 
home economy this U.S.–centric approach is not justified. Wilkins pointed out that 
there was a tendency to exaggerate the importance of U.S. FDI to the American 
economy. By 1970 the accumulated stock of FDI amounted to 8 per cent of GNP, 
whereas when Britain was the world’s greatest foreign investor in 1914, its stock of 
foreign investments represented more than one-and-a-half times its national income in 
that year. Similarly, the outflow of U.S. FDI in 1970 was less than half of one per cent 
of that year’s GNP whereas the annual outflow of capital from Britain averaged about 
4 per cent of national income in each of the fifty years to 1914, rising to 7 per cent in 
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the period 1905-1913. Even if one limits the comparison to the 1960s and to direct 
investment flows on various measures, foreign direct investment was a larger part of 
the economies of some European nations than of the American economy. In 1971 the 
American stock of FDI per head of population was exceeded marginally by the United 
Kingdom and Sweden and was less than half that of Switzerland.16 As Table 1 shows, 
direct investment flows were a larger proportion of gross domestic fixed capital 
formation in the U.K. and the Netherlands than the U.S. Its share of GDP was also 
larger in the U.K. Also, as Chart 1 illustrates, the growth in FDI from Britain grew 
across the 1960s at about the same rate as that from the U.S. Add to this that the U.K. 
had the second largest stock of FDI in the world at this time (about 16 per cent with 
no other country above 6 per cent) and it seems the obvious comparator nation to the 
U.S. experience. 
 
Table 1 Direct investment outflows as a percentage of gross domestic capital 
formation (average in each period) for various countries 
Source country 1960-62 1963-65 1966-68 1969-71 1972-74 
United States 3.0 3.5 3.6 4.0 4.0 
United Kingdom 5.0 4.6 4.2 6.2 9.0 
West Germany 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.2 
France 2.2a 1.3 1.1 0.8 1.3 
Italy 2.0b 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.7 
Netherlands 5.2 3.1 5.0 6.1 7.4 
Sweden 1.1 1.8 1.5 2.9 3.0 
Source: Stopford and Dunning, Multinationals, 11. 
a 1961-62 only b 1962 only 
 5
  
Chart 1 U.S. and U.K. FDI outflows 1960-74
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The two countries stand out not only because they were responsible for the 
vast majority of FDI in the period but also because in the 1960s policy-makers in both 
countries were increasingly concerned about the balance of payments. Although both 
countries supported the principle of liberalizing international capital movement, both 
Britain and the United States adopted policies to alleviate these balance of payments 
concerns. Amongst the measures taken were ones designed to restrict the flow of 
funds used for overseas direct investment. In the US this took the form of a voluntary 
control from 1965, which was turned into a mandatory control in 1968 and which 
lasted until 1974. In Britain the tool used was exchange control, in place since the 
Second World War, but tightened in 1961 and again in 1965 and 1966 to ensure that 
funds were only released for foreign direct investments which would offer a rapid 
return to the balance of payments. Since exchange control only dealt with transactions 
outside the Sterling Area, this was supplemented in 1965 by a call for restraint on 
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direct investment in those Commonwealth countries which were the main recipients 
of UK private direct investment and by the introduction of corporation tax, one aim of 
which was to increase the incentives for domestic investment over foreign investment. 
 
U.S. and U.K. controls over foreign direct investment  
In both cases there were a complex range of factors causing the balance of payments 
concerns but attention increasingly focused on capital outflows and in particular rising 
foreign direct investment as a key factor in these deficits: George Brown, the U.K. 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs talked of private overseas investment as being 
“responsible” for about half of the U.K. balance of payments deficit, while in the 
U.S., Grant Ackley, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, referred to 
FDI as “one of the largest and most steadily expanding drains on our balance of 
payments.”17 In both countries governments decided to take action to restrain capital 
outflows, including direct investment, to alleviate their balance of payments deficits.  
In the U.S. the Kennedy administration considered the restriction of capital 
exports as part of the 1962 Revenue Act, but its first serious action was to enact the 
Interest Equalization Tax in 1963, with the more limited objective of reducing the 
perceived favourable tax treatment of portfolio overseas investment.18 Attention 
turned more directly in 1965 to FDI, After “extensive discussion” it was agreed that 
“under present circumstances and at the present time, a strong across-the-board 
campaign of moral suasion over all forms of direct investment and bank and non-bank 
lending will produce as favourable results as tax action and would avoid the very real 
dangers of attempting to secure legislation in this area.”19 As part of this program 
U.S. firms were asked to cooperate in improving the state of the balance of payments. 
This took the form of a direct appeal in February 1965 by the Secretary of Commerce, 
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Jack Connor, and from President Johnson to the chief executives of about 600 major 
U.S. corporations to accelerate repatriation of overseas earnings in developed 
countries, avoid or postpone direct investment in marginal projects, to increase 
exports and to make greater use of non-U.S. sources of funding.20 As President 
Johnson told a group of business leaders in the White House – “If you guys don’t
help, Doug Dillon’s [Secretary of State for the Treasury] going to have to make me do
awful things. Save me and free enterprise from that.”
 
 
s 
 
. 
kely to achieve the required goal.  
 U.S. Department of Commerce Balance of Payments 
dvisory Committee 1965 
21 It was left to individual firm
to set their own targets at this stage but they were asked to draw up and submit a 
company balance of payments ledger of debits and credits for 1964 and then to set 
their own targets in the context of an overall goal of a 15-20 per cent improvement the
impact on the balance of payments in 1965 on that in 1964. In addition, Connor 
established a Balance of Payments Advisory Committee of businessmen, the 
membership of which is set out in Table 2, to help ensure the success of the program
There was no legal framework underpinning the appeal or other penalties but it was 
believed that, in the first instance at least, a personal approach to CEOs was most 
li
 
Table 2 Membership of the
A
 
Name Company and Position 
Albert L. Nickerson (chair) Chairman, Socony Mobil Oil Company 
Carter L. Burgess American Machine & Foundry Chairman, 
Company 
Fred J. Borch President, General Electric Company 
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Carl J. Gilbert Chairman, The Gillette Company 
Elisha Gray II Chairman, Whirlpool Corporation 
J. Ward Keener President, B.F. Goodrich Company 
George S. Moore President, First National City Bank 
Stuart T. Saunders Pennsylvania Railroad Chairman, 
Company 
Sidney J. Weinberg rtner, Goldman, Sachs & General Pa
Company 
Source: FRUS 1964-68, Volume VIII, memorandum 44, Editorial note. 
 
fears 
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the 
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vidual 
By the autumn there were concerns that direct investment was still rising and 
the administration had “to walk a tight rope” between having to avoid arousing 
that mandatory controls were likely as this would herald anticipatory action by
companies and showing that it was determined to have an effective voluntary 
program.22 Accordingly, it was agreed that the program for 1966 was widened to 9
corporations and more precise guidelines were provided for individual firms: they 
were to limit new FDI in the two-year period 1965-66 to 235 per cent of their annual
average of direct capital outflows and retained earnings of overseas subsidiaries for 
1962-64. A year later the 1967 program was tightened up once more in the light of 
growing military expenditure in Vietnam but only after a lengthy consideratio
whether the voluntary program would fall apart if pushed any further.23 The 
companies participating in the program were asked to increase their contribution to 
remedying the balance of payments by at least $2 billion above the 1966 level.24 A 
few firms seen as recalcitrant in not meeting their targets were called into indi
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meetings with the Secretary of Commerce. Table 3 sets out those companies 
able 3 U.S. companies written to in November 1967 to meet with the Secretary 
 their contribution to the Voluntary Program* 
highlighted in late 1967. 
 
T
of Commerce to discuss
 
Sterling Drug Company Xerox Corporation 
The Singer Company Hewlett-Packard Company 
W. R. Grace and Company pany Sunray DX Oil Com
Control Data Corporation Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
Amphenol Corporation J. Ray McDermott 
American Smelting and Refining Company Polaroid 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation Ampex 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company airchild Camera and Instrument F
Kellogg Company Barton Distilling 
Clevite Corporation  
 * In addition, General Mills and IBM had asked for meetings 
Source: FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VIII, memorandum 157, Memorandum from 
ecretary of Commerce Trowbridge to Secretary of the Treasury Fowler, 15 
Decem
s 
e 
S
ber 1967 
 
On New Year’s Day 1968 President Johnson announced that the program wa
to become mandatory, a sudden shift in policy agreed in the weeks following Britain’s 
November 1967 devaluation – as late as 15th December the Secretary of Commerce 
was still providing an update on the ongoing progress of the voluntary program.25 Th
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controls were imposed by Executive Order No. 11387, under authority of section 
of the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, which gave the President the
powers to regulate financial transactions in the best interests of the nation.
5(b) 
 
. 
 
rect 
t 
 other 
Nixon administration intended to remove the 
mandat e 
e 
ide 
26 The 
resulting Department of Commerce’s Foreign Direct Investment Regulations were 
policed by the newly created Office of Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) in the 
Department of Commerce and violations were, in theory at least, a criminal offence
The OFDI also gathered data on over 3000 enterprises. Direct investors were allowed
to choose among a range of ways of calculating their investment quotas and had to 
file annual (sometimes quarterly) returns such that capital outflows to finance di
investment would be reduced by $1 billion below the 1967 level. Countries in receipt 
of U.S. direct investment were divided into three groups: schedule A – the less 
developed countries; Schedule B – those developed countries judged to be dependen
on continuing inflows of U.S. capital (including Britain); and Schedule C – all
countries (including Western Europe). The implications were that control was least 
severe on schedule A countries and most severe on investment in schedule C 
countries. In 1969 the newly-appointed 
ory program but had to content itself with a gradual easing instead, until thes
controls were finally removed in 1974. 
U.K. controls were rather different and more longstanding. Controls on the 
export of capital went back to the First World War but post-Second World War 
controls centred on exchange control, which had been introduced under emergency 
powers at the outset of the war and then was made permanent by the Exchang
Control Act 1947.27 This covered all overseas investments (portfolio or direct) outs
the Sterling Area. In order to save reserves of foreign currency private direct 
investment in the non-sterling area had to show a positive gain to the economy, in 
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particular to the balance of payments. In contrast, direct investment within the 
Sterling Area was allowed freely - investment in the Commonwealth was “a vit
economic and political interest of the U.K.” and no additional controls were deem
desirable.
al 
ed 
 
dom and would show a reasonable economic 
advanta
 
 
the 
in 
gn 
 what 
gulations was impracticable for them. 
ial 
28 Over the 1950s the restrictions imposed under the legislation were
gradually eased such that “by 1956, practically no outward investment that was 
controlled from the United King
ge to this country was refused,” in which case foreign exchange was provided 
at the official exchange rate.29  
Then in the summer of 1961 a series of emergency measures were introduced
to alleviate Britain’s balance of payments problems. As a result, exchange control was
tightened, adopting two criteria for judging applications for direct investment in 
non-sterling area: “clear and commensurate benefits in U.K. export earnings” with
18 months, or the development of a demand for British exports unrelated to the 
original investment.30 In addition, the earnings of overseas subsidiaries had to be 
remitted back to the U.K. parent as far as possible. In practice the eighteen-month 
period was operated flexibly, soon raised to two years, and within a year the policy 
was being applied more liberally.31 From May 1962 those companies refused forei
exchange at the official rate were often allowed to buy investment currency on
had been known as the dollar switch market, but became the investment currency 
market.32 Also, any “reasonable” application for less than £25,000 of foreign 
exchange was also always approved. There was one group of companies excepted 
from these tighter regulations. U.K. oil companies – effectively Shell and B.P. – 
persuaded the Treasury that application of the re
Instead, annual negotiations took place to decide an appropriate “ration” of offic
exchange to be used for overseas investment.33 
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 By 1964 the Treasury was already examining ways of imposing further 
exchange control restrictions, including consideration of imposing exchange control 
within the sterling area.34 The April 1965 budget put in place measures whic
hoped would reduce FDI. First, corporation tax was introduced (see below), which
was hoped would reduce the incentive for firms to invest abroad. Secondly, 
restrictions on overseas investment were tightened so that in addition to being no 
burden on the balance of payments after the short term, there also had to be a good 
prospect of a continuing return on the balance of payments for the use of official 
exchange to be approved.
h it was 
 it 
 
not meeting the government’s original criteria 
for use
 
in 
 
 
nal 
35 Then in July the restrictions were intensified: no direct
investment could use official exchange. Even those applications that met the criteria 
set out, so-called “criterion” cases, had to obtain funds from either the investment 
currency market or foreign borrowing.36 Yet further intensification followed in May 
1966. Now “non-criterion” cases, those 
 of official exchange, were refused access to the investment currency market 
and could only use foreign borrowing.  
In addition, measures were taken to deal with the increasing discrimination 
between the non-Sterling Area, with its ever tighter exchange control, and the Sterling
Area where there remained no restriction on capital outflows. Drawing on American 
experience, a “Voluntary Programme” was introduced to control direct investment 
four developed sterling area countries, namely Australia, South Africa, New Zealand
and Eire. Its announcement was followed up by letters from the Chancellor of the
Exchequer to the chairmen of around 300 individual firms asking for their perso
co-operation in ensuring that only those projects which were funded by overseas 
borrowing or retained profits, or offered the prospect of “early, substantial and 
continuing” benefit to the balance of payments, were undertaken.37 The Voluntary 
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Programme remained in place until 1972 when, with the floating of sterling, exchange 
control was extended to the Sterling Area. Exchange control was eased in 1968 with 
the creation of a new “supercriterion”: FDI could be financed by official exchan
to £50,000 or 50 per cent of the investment, whichever was greater, if it was aimed at 
promoting exports, would pay for itself in terms of the balance of payments in 
eighteen months and continue to benefit the balance of payments thereafter.
ge up 
rther 
d the 
s and the 
aximum amount of official exchange for “supercriterion” cases was increased to 
xchange control was eventually removed in 1979.40 
the 
nd half of the sixties. 
here was a gradual decrease in the period of voluntary restraint and a sharp reduction 
able 4 U.S. direct inve  
38 Fu
relaxation occurred in 1971 as the balance of payments position improved an
prospect of entry into the European Economic Community neared: access to the 
investment currency market being restored for “non-criterion” case
m
£250,000.39 E
 
Similarities 
a) Impact: macro-level 
There is general agreement that both the U.S. and U.K. controls impacted upon FDI. 
However, this was less in terms of the actual level of FDI undertaken by firms than in 
respect of the form of funding. Looking at U.S. controls first, there was a belief at 
time that the mandatory control, in particular, had a significant short-term downward 
impact on capital transfers from the U.S. and thus from a narrow perspective was 
successful in alleviating the size of the balance of payments deficit.41 Table 4 shows 
how U.S. direct investment funded from the U.S. fell in the seco
T
in 1968, well beyond the target of $1 bn. below the 1967 level. 
 
T stment transactions, excluding Canada, 1965-69 ($ bn)
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  Data for 3300 Office of Foreign Direct Investment reporting firms            Projections 
                                                       Fr ajor  
                                                                                                                      companies 
                                                               om 469 m
Total of all schedules, 
excluding Canada 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Reinvested earnings 1.02 1.08 0.92 1.21 1.67 
Capital transfers, 
including use of 
foreign borrowing 
3.10 3.44 3.35 2.47 3.42 
Direct investment, 
including use of 
foreign borrowing 
4.12 4.52 4.27 3.68 5.09 
Use by direct investor 
of long-term foreign 
(0.11) (0.65) (0.56) (2.22) (2.30) 
borrowings 
Direct investment, 4.01 3.87 3.71 1.46 2.79 
excluding use of 
foreign borrowings 
 
Source: Willey, “Direct Investment Controls,” 99. 
 
What the table also shows is how, despite the reduction in transfers, the decline in the 
level of direct investment was nothing like as substantial because of the increased use 
of foreign borrowing and, to a lesser extent, reinvested earnings. Indeed, Don Cadle, 
the acting director of the OFDI was confident enough to assert in 1969 that “after 
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talking to many hundreds of business, we have no reason to believe that the U.S. 
companies, using either foreign capital or U.S. capital under their quotas, did not 
invest pretty much what they wanted to invest last year.”42 This was contested by 
some a s 
he 
ling 
reatly 
, 
 
 to the level of commitments outstanding where 
uthorisations had been granted but companies were yet to implement them, a further 
t the time, for example Peter Lindert, but the contemporary official view seem
to have become the conventional wisdom.43 
Much the same story has been told for the U.K. and the impact of exchange 
control. The U.K. Treasury certainly believed that exchange control was reducing t
outflow of capital used for foreign direct investment.44 Yet the impact on U.K. FDI 
was more limited. The trend in U.K. FDI in the non-sterling area remained clearly 
upward and Cairncross saw no marked divergence between sterling and non-ster
investment.45 His first impression from the figures was “one of astonishment at the 
very large increase, particularly in the non-sterling area, over a period when the 
controls were being steadily tightened. Direct investment cannot have been g
restricted over the period as a whole.”46 As shown in Table 5, in 1963 less than five 
per cent of applications were refused, amounting to only 1.6 per cent of the 
applications’ total value and Table 6 again shows a relatively small level of refusals
both suggesting that exchange control was not much of a deterrent to overseas 
investment. Even when the criteria were at their severest it was believed that most 
firms envisaging applying under exchange control were able to meet the criteria of a 
rapid return in terms of export growth.47 There were few cases found of companies
being unable to finance FDI even by bodies looking for such evidence.48 Indeed, the 
Treasury paid increasing attention
a
indication of limited hardship.49 
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Table 5 U.K. Exchange con
Number of applications Total sum involved (£m.) 
trol in 1963 
 
 
Full approval at the official 
rate of exchange 
  959   85 
Full approval for financing 
via borrowing abroad 
ess to the ‘switch’ 
rket 
1527 217.5 
      9   30 
Given acc
dollar ma
  484   99 
Refused     75     3.5 
TOTAL 
Source: MRC MSS200/F/3/E3/32/10, “Note of a Meeting Held at the Treasury on 
riday, June 26th, 1964.” 
able 6 Exchange control authorizations and refusals 1963-September 1968 (£ 
m.) 
 
1 196 1967 
F
qua
(exc. 
Jun
F
 
 
T
  963* 1964 1965 6
irst 3 
rters 
1968 
e)**
Official exchange       
Remittances 6 42 2
uarantees  6 21.3 0 0 0.0
5.8 8 3.4 6 2.6 4.2
4.4 .2 9.4 0 0 4.3
G
Exports f.o.p. 
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cy       
s 69.2 80 4
3
0.2 1.2 3.3 2.5 27.8 3.8
1
erm 
risations 200.2 235.2 305.8 197.4 232.4 227.9
Investment curren
Remittance 78 .3 6.4 34.6 4.7
Euro Dollar 
borrowing 0 5.5 4 12 10.9 6.8
Short term 
borrowing 
Guarantees 29.9 74.7 49.6 98.8 108 95.1
Long-t
borrowing 30.7 19.6 14.5 31.7 48.5 78.9
Total 
autho
Refusals 2.9 3.2 17 1 1 4.8
 
Source: TNA T295/397-8, various papers. 
ble 3 because of revisions. 
control – red
50
remittances back from subsidiaries but one area of contention was the average period 
* The figures differ from Ta
**Figures for June 1968 missing. 
 
As in the U.S. case, and as also shown in Table 6, the tightening of exchange control 
forced a change in methods of financing FDI with increased reliance on unremitted 
profits, direct borrowing abroad by parent companies (and guarantees) and Eurodollar 
borrowing as all, apart from oil companies, were prevented from using official 
exchange. Again, like the U.S. case, this interpretation of the impact of exchange 
ucing capital transfers but not FDI because of the use of alternative 
sources of funding – has become the conventional wisdom.  
What was less clear was the impact of FDI on the balance of payments. It was 
commonly accepted that in the long term FDI had a positive impact through 
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before the initial FDI outflow was matched by these returning remittances. If t
recoupment period was long then there was greater justification for imposing 
restrictions on FDI as a short-term measure to alleviate a balance of payments defi
Related to this was the more general issue of the extent to which FDI and exports 
were substitutes or complementary. Academics were sharply divided on the issue, as 
well as on the period required for direct investment to induce a positive contribution 
to the balance of payments, the recoupment period.
he 
cit. 
 U.S. 
of U.K. 
pact, a quicker return and higher 
long-te
 
er 
nt 
as 
51 Two famous studies embarked 
on addressing these crucial and contentious issues in the mid-1960s, one in the
and the other in the U.K. In the U.S. Hufbauer and Adler produced Overseas 
Manufacturing Investment and the Balance of Payments while Brian Reddaway led a 
team at Cambridge which produced an interim and final report on the Effects 
Direct Investment Overseas.52 Hufbauer and Adler considered a wider set of 
hypotheses but when they used the same methodology as Reddaway they found a 
smaller immediate balance of payments adverse im
rm benefits to the balance of payments.53  
However, neither study resolved the underlying issue mainly because it was 
incapable of being resolved. Reddaway showed that while the average value of the 
FDI which took the form of exports of plant and machinery was 11 per cent over the
period 1955-64, this varied between sectors markedly: only 1 per cent for the pap
industry to 21 per cent for motor vehicles.54 Also both studies showed that a key 
assumption was what would happen in the absence of the FDI: would the investme
still be undertaken by some other party not from the home country or would it be 
possible to maintain exports? There was no general answer to this question; it w
dependent on the circumstances in each individual case given the complex and 
heterogeneous factors involved in each investment decision. In this respect the 
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relationship between foreign investment and exports was “haphazard” and whether 
support or restrict it involved “an
to 
 intuitive leap.”55 Economists could not provide a 
efinitive answer to this issue.56 
se for 
 
uld 
es 
968. As one official put it, almost 
y accident, the Treasury had “struck a winner.”58  
 
d
 
b) Impact: micro-level 
This diversity of experience means that it is important to consider the impact of the 
controls on firms in a more detailed way and to see if the similarity of experience for 
U.S. and U.K. multinationals was still present. In this respect, the impact of the shift 
in the sources of financing FDI becomes relevant. This was not a costless exerci
both American and British firms looking to invest abroad. First, while the U.S. 
government encouraged firms to borrow overseas from the outset of the Voluntary 
Co-operation Program from 1965, the same was not the case in Britain.57 There was
little confidence or expectation in the U.K. Treasury that foreign borrowing wo
replace the use of official exchange when exchange control was tightened: the 
expectation was that FDI would be reduced. It was only in 1967, partly because of 
previous deficiencies in U.K. FDI statistics, that it became clear that U.K. compani
were making increasing use of the Eurodollar market and the scale of this foreign 
borrowing only became firmly established in May 1
b
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Chart 2 U.K. Investment Currency Premium 1962-1974
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Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (various issues) 
 
In any case, for some companies at least foreign borrowing was more 
expensive. This was true for some American companies using the Eurodollar market 
but is clearest for British companies using the investment currency market. There was 
a premium that had to be paid for investment currency over the price for official 
exchange. The size of the premium reflected the size of the pool of currency available 
and the demand for the currency. Chart 2 sets out the movements of the premium 
from 1962 when companies could access the pool for direct investments. Having been 
less than 3 per cent in part of 1962 the premium rose steadily over the decade, to 
around 10 per cent in 1965 and to over 50 per cent at times in 1968 and 1969 before 
falling back and then rising sharply again from 1973.59  
Cairncross thought that the investment currency premium was deterring FDI 
as early as 1963-65 when the premium was still relatively low and ceteris paribus one 
would expect the higher price would deter some companies at the margin.60 However, 
it was believed that rather than deterring FDI the premium was affecting the timing of 
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investment with companies delaying investment in line with fluctuations in the 
investment currency premium rather than reacting to the long-term upward trend in 
the 1960s.61 The same is true of the impact of the U.S. controls on the Eurodollar rate, 
as shown in Chart 3.62 After the introduction of the Voluntary Co-operation Program 
and even more after the introduction of the Mandatory Program, the Eurodollar rate 
appreciated noticeably. The U.S. government viewed this as a sign of the success of 
their policy.63 The other side of the coin was that it was expected that it would 
become harder for some companies, American and British, to access the Eurodollar 
market.64 Other particular aspects of the controls in the U.S. and the U.K. affected the 
strategies of individual companies. In the U.S. Eastman Kodak Co. departed from its 
traditional stance of avoiding long-term debt to float a long-term debt issue on the 
Eurobond market.65 ITT and others complained that the forced repatriation of 
subsidiary earnings according to a fixed formula caused problems for the 
development of their subsidiaries.66 
 
Chart 3 End of Month Interest Rates on 3-Month London Euro-Dollar Deposits 1960-74
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  There was also an issue of bureaucracy. In the U.S. the Balance of Payments 
Advisory Committee made clear the importance of avoiding red tape, to which Jack 
Connor responded by watering down the original proposals for the Voluntary 
Program, but then faced criticism from his colleagues that the program was too weak 
and vague.67 In the U.K. some companies were concerned at the delay in getting a 
decision over whether exchange control approval would be gained. For example, in 
1961 Joseph Lucas (Industries) Ltd. wished to start a joint venture with a local firm in 
Argentina as they had found it impossible to export their electrical products there. The 
company was concerned that the Argentinian market was competitive and it was 
“imperative” to move quickly: “Bosch and other competitors are active there and will 
extend their grip on the local industry if we do not move quickly and forestall 
them.”68 However, there was a delay in making the decision because it raised a 
general principle on which ministerial approval was required and the company 
became agitated at the delay not just because of the desire to move forward with the 
developments in Argentina but more pressingly because they were in a queue for the 
loan and were worried that they would lose their place if a decision was not 
forthcoming.69 Even allowing for exaggeration of its case by the company, such 
uncertainties and delays must have been commonplace. 
Equally, there is evidence of companies trying to avoid the controls affecting 
their direct investment strategies. Under the Voluntary Co-operation Program 
companies could meet the called for improving their individual balance of payments 
by increasing exports and much of the improvement was predicted in companies’ 
returns to come from this aspect rather than cutting FDI directly.70 Similarly, in the 
U.K., it appeared that companies were “actively seeking methods of maximising there 
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incidental returns in order to secure the most favourable terms of approval for their 
investment.”71 Others, like Raytheon (with British Petroleum), ITT and the Scottish 
shipbuilding company Lithgows, attempted to evade the U.S. regulations by trying to 
organise parallel loans with their U.S. or U.K. counterparts.72  
In this respect it is important to remember the extent to which both U.S. and 
U.K. FDI was dominated by a few companies. Thus, in the American case, although 
Connor wrote to 3000 companies as part of the Voluntary Co-operation Program, in 
1965 80 per cent of the FDI involved was carried out by 100 companies.73 In the U.K. 
FDI was even more concentrated: 70 firms were responsible for over 80 per cent of 
FDI and just thirteen for over 45 per cent.74 Given that U.K. oil companies like Shell 
and B.P., both major direct investors abroad, were not subject to exchange control but 
negotiated a ration of official exchange with the Treasury is, therefore, highly 
significant. It also reminds us that while the overall macro-level picture is important, 
individual actions by particular companies matter too. The Economist article quoted at 
the start of the article was prompted by the impact of individual corporate transactions 
– outward by Shell and inward by Ford – on the U.K. balance of payments.75 Indeed, 
the case of Shell is illuminating. In 1963 the U.K. Treasury asked Shell to find 30 per 
cent of its foreign exchange requirements, or £30 m., from the investment currency 
market. Shell’s response was to request a renegotiation of Shell/Treasury agreement 
which would have been highly disadvantageous to the Treasury and the proposal was 
dropped. Four years later the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Shell again to 
consider raising a proportion of its needs on the investment currency market in 
1968.76 Once more the company argued against this and Treasury officials were 
reluctant to take the matter any further because of the threat to tear up the agreement 
being repeated. 
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It is only once one examines cases like this at this more detailed level that the 
range of factors related to the controls which impacted upon business becomes 
evident. Thus there were a range of costs that existed. The particular costs varied in 
each individual case, which when added to the diverse relationship found between 
FDI and exports in different sectors made the position highly complex and contingent. 
Nevertheless, the existence of such costs was common in the U.S. and the U.K. and 
helps to explain the unity and vehemence with which business attacked the controls. 
In addition, that the issue was so dependent on the underlying assumptions adopted 
and academia was unable to provide a definitive resolution in part explains the 
strident division of opinion between governments and business in both the U.S. and 
the U.K. It is now possible to turn to consider these attitudes, first of government and 
then of business. 
 
c) Government attitudes 
The degree of similarity in the views held by the British and American governments is 
striking. First, governments on both sides of the Atlantic tended to view FDI as a 
substitute for exports rather than a complement and thus restrictions on capital 
outflows provided an opportunity for increased exports. A U.S. Treasury study found 
that every U.S. $ of FDI in manufacturing only yielded 19 cents in annual net exports 
to that subsidiary and for FDI to Western Europe it was only 4 cents.77 The equivalent 
study in the U.K. came up with a 9 per cent initial return in exports on FDI.78 
Secondly, there was a tendency to view the recoupment period on any FDI as long. 
Hufbauer and Adler found an average recoupment period of 9 years in the U.S. and 
Reddaway one of 14 years in the U.K., that is the length of time for an initial 
investment to pay itself off in terms of inflows favourable to the balance of 
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payments.79 However, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury announced that based on a 
study of U.S. FDI to Western Europe and Canada 1957-60 the recoupment period was 
17 years.80 All this evidence was seen as ample justification for controlling FDI 
outflows from the U.S. and from the U.K. as part of a package of measures to deal 
with the balance of payments deficits.81 
 Equally, both governments were willing to tighten restrictions on FDI further 
when the balance of payments deficits proved obdurate. In particular, in the U.S. 
many in the Johnson administration felt let down by what was perceived as a 
disappointing response from the business community and Connor repeatedly had to 
justify the path chosen.82 Secretary of Defense McNamara was the most critical, 
commenting in late 1965 that the President believed the program had failed and that 
he (McNamara) did not understand what the program was really about.83 The 
following year with the rising cost of the Vietnam War putting further pressure on the 
balance of payments, Connor defended the Voluntary Co-operation Program against 
demands for further tightening at the Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments 
by “clarifying certain misconceptions.”84 While he resolutely refused to back down he 
seems to have had little success in persuading his colleagues that their support for 
tightening the program was misconceived; the committee failed to reach agreement on 
the issue after three hours of discussion.85 Indeed McNamara commented pointedly, 
“We are being asked to cut back in our basic foreign policy objectives in order that 
U.S. corporations may continue their investing overseas.”86 In a nutshell, he had set 
out how most in the U.S. administration felt about corporate efforts to respond to the 
nation’s needs. 
In both the U.S. and the U.K. there were efforts to encourage business to 
export more instead of using FDI but in the U.K. this went much further and had a 
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different dimension to those in the U.S. In the U.S. there were concerns about the 
balance of payments deficit and U.S. competitiveness and about the implications of 
multinational enterprise for U.S. competitiveness.87 The same concerns existed in 
Britain but they were underpinned by fears about British economic decline: in the late 
1950s and 1960s “declinism” became an increasingly dominant paradigm and 
attention centred not only on Britain’s low growth rate but also on Britain’s declining 
share of world trade in manufactures.88 In particular, it became increasingly common 
to associate Britain’s low growth rate with a low level of domestic investment, an 
argument made by Andrew Shonfield amongst others.89 
Concerns about overseas investment crowding out domestic investment had 
been a recurring theme in Britain since the late nineteenth century. John Maynard 
Keynes had criticized a preference for foreign investment (in this case portfolio 
investment) over domestic investment in the 1920s.90 He distinguished between the 
social return to investment and the private return, arguing that the social return was 
higher for domestic investment than for foreign investment because at a minimum the 
assets would be retained in the home economy.91 Exchange control could help to 
change the balance between foreign and domestic investment but was seen as a 
temporary crisis measure (although it had been in place for many years). The 
strongest exponents of this view were the Labour government’s economic advisers 
Tommy Balogh and Nicholas Kaldor.92 Papers by each of them were discussed in 
Whitehall in January 1965.93 Balogh argued that the ‘habitual tendency’ to overinvest 
abroad since 1914 had ‘severely restricted’ home investment potential and led to 
growing illiquidity which resulted in the constant threat of a balance of payments 
crisis.94 He continued:  
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There tends to be a divergence between the interests of individual 
firms and the interests of the nation as a whole. There are cases where it is 
more profitable for a firm to invest abroad than at home, but undesirable in the 
national interest that it should be allowed to do so. 
What is needed then is a set of measures designed to discourage 
investment overseas, and encourage it at home. To some extent this can be 
done by a tightening of the existing exchange control machinery…. But it also 
seems advisable to make use of the tax system to affect the relative 
attractiveness of domestic and foreign investment. 
 
Kaldor too was concerned by the need to restrain overseas investment and to 
encourage domestic investment, ideas which he went on to elaborate in his inaugural 
lecture in Cambridge, Causes of the slow rate of economic growth of the U.K. and 
became the notion of export-led growth, to become so influential in development 
economics.95 Kaldor’s solution to Britain’s problems lay with the tax system too.96 
While their detailed proposals differed both emphasized the role of corporation tax, to 
which the Labour government was already committed and was introduced later in 
1965, as a way of changing the balance between home and overseas investment. 
Government officials believed both Balogh and Kaldor oversimplified and overstated 
their cases but they commonly accepted that Britain invested excessively abroad and 
that the return to the individual firm on FDI was not a good indicator of the return to 
the nation.97 Indeed, corporation tax was seen as “the corner-stone of the 
government’s long-term strategy to produce a shift of emphasis away from investment 
abroad towards that at home.”98 With more incentive to invest at home it was hoped 
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that not only would this lead to increasing exports, solving the balance of payments 
problem, but also improve Britain’s long-term growth performance.  
Governments in both countries saw the nation’s interests best served by 
correcting the balance of payments via increased exports and that increasing FDI was 
an obstacle to those increased exports. Accordingly, both governments were willing to 
restrict FDI with the aim of improving the balance of payments deficit. In both the 
U.S. and the U.K., therefore, governments were explicit in their awareness of the 
divergence of interests between firms’ interests and those of the nation. However, it 
was in the British case that these tensions were more explicit, were given a long-term 
perspective and related more explicitly to national competitiveness and economic 
growth. There was, therefore, a stronger critique in Britain in the mid-1960s of 
outward FDI given the context of “declinism”. In this respect the gap between 
business and government over the contribution of FDI and multinational enterprise to 
the national economy was greater in Britain than in the U.S. 
 
d) Business attitudes 
Just as U.S. and U.K. governments held comparable views on the general issue of 
outward FDI in the 1960s so the same can be said of U.S. and U.K. business and these 
views were at odds with those of their governments. First, business communities on 
both sides of the Atlantic were outspoken in their opposition to the imposition and 
maintenance of these controls.99 In their meetings with their respective governments 
business representatives made clear that this distaste for such controls could be 
tempered in the short term in recognition of the crisis nature of the balance of 
payments problem but this conditional support evaporated when the controls 
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continued to stay in place. As the President of the Federation of British Industries 
(FBI) told Jim Callaghan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 1965: 
 
If overseas investment on its recent scale could be shown to be a net burden on 
the balance of payments, we should support its reduction until the economy 
was strong enough to sustain it. If the problem were that of balancing short-
term loss against long-term gain, we would understand that in a precarious 
situation policy might have to be determined by short-term needs however 
great the long-term sacrifice might be. What we find difficult to understand is 
the decision to reduce overseas investment both in the long and in the short-
term on the footing that it is imperative for the short-term needs of the balance 
of payments - and this in the face of evidence that it may even aggravate our 
short-term imbalance.100 
 
 To some extent such criticism of government policy was simply business 
rhetoric but there was a common sense of exasperation and frustration that 
government did not understand modern international business. Mirroring the feelings 
of business in Britain, in 1967 the Balance of Payments Advisory Committee told the 
Johnson administration that it could not count on business support for the voluntary 
program much longer and if the advisory committee believed the government’s target 
for FDI for 1968 was below what the committee felt business could deliver, then the 
committee would prefer the use of mandatory controls.101 The President of G.E.C. 
and wrote to Jack Connor’s successor as Secretary of Commerce, Sandy Trowbridge
in his frustration and clearly at odds with the government view of FD
, 
I: 
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To put it mildly, I was quite discouraged by the trend of events at the Balance 
of Payments Advisory Committee last week to the point of asking myself 
whether it is any longer meaningful for such a group of businessmen to 
attempt to meaningfully advise the Administration on this very important 
subject. 
 There seems to be some in the Administration who profess to believe 
that if business would stop exporting dollars into direct foreign investments 
the balance-of-payments problem would be solved. This attitude reflects itself 
in a constant hammering to reduce this relatively minor element of the 
balance-of-payments deficit. It further overlooks what all the businessmen on 
the Advisory Committee keep repeating; namely, that direct investments are a 
very significant element in maintaining or improving the U.S. trade balance…. 
 The record will show that the voluntary program has done an 
outstanding job by any measurement, and in my opinion this is because it was 
initially properly focused on the overall contribution that a business could 
make. This originally was the prime target, and properly so. In the last two 
years, emphasis has turned from the overall contribution to the matter of direct 
investments – in other words, from the “dog to the tail,” as someone expressed 
it.102 
 
Behind this frustration lay a common view, held by the business communities 
on both sides of the Atlantic, very different from that common in both U.S. and U.K. 
administrations at this time. First, business argued that there would be a long-term 
cost to the balance of payments in terms of lost future remittances, remittances which 
were far greater than the original FDI.103  More than this, the return on FDI, it was 
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argued, was quicker than the Hufbauer and Adler and Reddaway studies had 
indicated. One study for the U.S. National Foreign Trade Council suggested a two-
year recoupment period.104 Thirdly, a key factor was a concern about foreign 
competition. Failure to undertake FDI could not simply be replaced by U.S. or U.K. 
exports. Multinationals from other countries would fill the void by undertaking the 
FDI themselves instead: “if we don’t build the new plants, the Germans will.”105 A 
Harvard Business School study, funded by the Department of Commerce, 
corroborated this point in finding that most U.S. investment was “defensive” in that 
the companies concerned would have lost out to foreign competition if they had not 
embarked on FDI and only exported.106 
Business in both countries argued that it was wrong to focus on the directly 
attributable exports and remittances associated with a particular investment. Instead, 
there were many indirect consequences of FDI which meant that exports and FDI 
were better seen as complementary rather than direct substitutes.107 As an influential 
U.S. National Industrial Conference Board-sponsored report suggested at the time, 
company investment behaviour was “organic” rather than “incremental” or, as 
Raymond Vernon put it, dynamic rather than static. To isolate a particular investment 
and associate particular returns with that investment was misleading. Rather each 
decision to undertake FDI was part of a wider story for the firm of developing in a 
variety of ways in response to market opportunities.108 FDI was not simply about the 
relative yield on capital but related to the dynamics of the growth of the individual 
firm in which FDI was only one aspect of the subject.109 This indeed was the 
argument put forward by the U.K. business community and over the course of the 
1960s the FBI increasingly emphasized the internationalisation of business as part of 
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its critique of exchange control and corporation tax. As early as 1964 an internal 
report on interviews with sixteen major U.K. exporters noted: 
 
They [companies] regard direct exports and other ways of earning money 
overseas in the same light. Their approach is to look at all areas of the world 
and examine the methods by which they can get the best return - whether by 
export, licensing and know-how agreements, local assembly or manufacture, 
or any combination of these. In this there is a dichotomy of thinking between 
industry and government which is in part a result of the divergence of interests 
between company and country in the short and medium term and in part, as it 
seems to industry, of a lack of understanding by government of the realities of 
overseas business.110 
 
U.K. business representatives made a similar complaint in 1969: 
 
Critics sometimes imply that British companies should have sought to build up 
their overseas sales by means of direct exporting alone, and that investing 
overseas is an alternative, or addition to, exporting. 
 Such a view is based on a complete misunderstanding of the nature of 
international competition. Investments abroad are undertaken by 
manufacturing companies for many diverse reasons. Essentially, however, 
industry invests overseas because, in a particular commercial situation, foreign 
investment is the only appropriate competitive weapon.... All [reasons for 
overseas investment] are related to the requirements of establishing and 
maintaining an effective competitive position in world markets when failure to 
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invest will strengthen foreign competitors. Hence, the consequences for the 
competitive stance of a particular company, and ultimately of the whole 
British economy, if overseas investment is discouraged can be extremely 
serious.111 
 
There was a perception in business that “a new world economy” was taking shape and 
that the controls imposed by national governments on FDI frustrated business 
engagement with this process of globalization.112 However, although the spectre of 
“corporate migrants” was raised at the time, there was little sense that nation-states 
were threatened or a desire to threaten them.113 Instead, the business communities on 
both sides of the Atlantic were voicing their frustration that in creating obstacles to 
their involvement in this process, the respective national economies would suffer. 
“Killing the goose that lays golden eggs” became a common complaint in American 
business circles about their governments’ failure to take this new global economy on 
board.114 Yet the phrase is also extremely revealing: business was complaining that 
government action was harming something of special value to the nation’s economic 
well-being, reflecting a different approach to national competitiveness. 
 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the growth of foreign direct investment in the 1960s caused increased 
tension between multinational enterprises (and the business community more 
generally) and national governments. This is evident in the different attitudes shown 
towards the contribution of increasing FDI to the state of the balance of payments in 
the U.S. and the U.K. To governments it was a significant cause of the problems by 
replacing exports while, to business, it was the means to continued economic success 
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– the goose that laid the golden eggs. In addition, government viewed FDI as a 
discrete decision whereas business saw it as part of the organic growth of the 
company. Both parties also accepted that there was a divergence of firm and national 
interests in the short term at least. Thus there was a clear difference of opinion about 
the contribution of multinational enterprise to the national economy. U.S. and U.K. 
national governments’ view of multinational enterprise’s contribution to the home 
economy remained location-based while business in the U.S. and U.K. tended to 
adopt an ownership-based perspective.115 Nevertheless, that business framed its 
arguments on the basis of the contribution of multinational enterprise to the U.S. and 
U.K. national economies downplays the idea that national sovereignty was at bay in 
any fundamental way. There was the case of Shell being powerful enough to call the 
bluff of the U.K. government over its ration of official exchange by threatening to end 
the Treasury-Shell Agreement but this was an exception and was due largely to the 
unique structure of the company with a Dutch as well as a U.K. board. The article 
therefore supports the work of other business historians who have emphasized the 
importance of the home economy to multinational enterprise in general and Mira 
Wilkins argument that in this period, “The U.S.-controlled multinational corporation 
has overcome obstacles to become both giant and formidable, but, as in the past, it 
still must bow to the power of national sovereignties.”116 Having to bow to this power 
was the cause of the sense of frustration that it was misunderstood. 
However, this article adds to this picture in a number of significant ways. 
First, it compares American experience with that in Britain. That comparative 
dimension shows that the focus of existing accounts on the American experience can 
be misleading. In terms of the relationship with the home government the American 
experience was matched by that in the U.K. The British government took a similar 
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position to that of the American administrations which was at odds with the views of 
business on both sides of the Atlantic. This is not then a story of American 
particularism. Rather it is a more general story of the relationship between 
multinational enterprise and national governments. What remains unclear is whether 
this is an Anglo-American story or a more general one but this may prove impossible 
to answer as other home governments did not impose similar restrictions on FDI at 
this time. 
As noted in the introduction, Wilkins has also suggested that on the surface it 
would appear that the impact of U.S. government policies was greater than previously 
and this reflected the enlarged role of both government and business. This at odds 
with the consensus that has emerged since that the impact of the U.S. and U.K. 
controls on FDI was limited: it changed the source of funding rather than the level of 
FDI. This article helps to bring these two accounts together. One of the problems with 
the consensus view has been to explain why business and government were so 
outspoken in their criticism of each other, even allowing for rhetorical licence. This 
suggested that Wilkins was right to suggest some impact, though she clearly sides 
with the business side of the argument in viewing FDI as part of a process with an 
“evolutionary, cumulative nature.”117 This impact becomes clearer when one moves 
from a macro-level approach to a micro-level one by considering the impact of the 
controls on individual companies. While there may have been few cases where the 
controls made the funding of FDI impossible the controls did create a number of 
obstacles, such as bureaucracy and time lags in getting funding, the cost of access to 
the investment currency market and to overseas borrowing and the difficulty of 
accessing overseas borrowing for some companies new to FDI. These obstacles 
increased the costs of FDI but in different ways for different firms. Since the majority 
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of FDI in both countries was undertaken by a relatively small number of companies, 
these individual experiences matter. This highlights a more general issue about the 
complex effects of government policy on business: macroeconomic policy goals often 
had microeconomic effects which were often overlooked or downplayed at the time. 
Equally, there were unintended consequences (both good and bad). For example, as 
shown here, the British government had not encouraged or expected British 
multinationals to use foreign borrowing so extensively but were ultimately pleased 
with the development, though it negated the desired effect of reducing FDI in favour 
of investment at home. 
The subject also shows the importance of a business history approach, without 
which these firm-level differences of experience would be pasteurised away in 
accounts of the overall picture. It also shows the value of access to archival material. 
Use of these sources not only adds depth and richness to our understanding but allows 
the historian to tease out the significance of these different experiences. However, this 
is no easy task and in many ways this article highlights the difficulty of such work. It 
might be expected that more companies’ records would be available for the postwar 
period but this does not appear to be the case. Some businesses seem reluctant to 
make their archival materials available for fear of anti-trust action, others for cost 
reasons. The ongoing merger and acquisition wave also complicates the situation with 
ownership and managements changing and with that policy on archival materials. 
This can lead to material becoming available but often leads to closure of access to 
archival materials. If nothing else, in particular with the international nature of many 
of these acquisitions, it adds to the uncertainty of access for business historians trying 
to build up a picture of the experiences of a number of firms.118 
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To some extent these difficulties are eased by use of national archives. Here 
there is a wealth of material to be consulted, much of which throws light on the 
experience of businesses. Valuable though this is, again there are problems. Only a 
small proportion of government records are retained which means that the relevant 
material may no longer exist. National archives have selection policies that make this 
likely. Those files preserved tend to be policy files rather than case study files, unless 
the case studies raise general principles or precedents. Mira Wilkins, as a historian, 
may have been stymied in the early 1970s by lack of access to the archival materials 
relevant to this subject. Nearly forty years on much of that archival material is now 
available but equally much remains unavailable, either destroyed, closed or still 
awaiting cataloguing. Use of the archival material available does alter our 
understanding of the subject in important ways – the comparative aspect, the need to 
move beyond macro-level generalisations of the experience of the controls, for 
example – but this will no doubt be added to as other archival materials become 
available. As set out in the introduction, Mira Wilkins suggested that it was only when 
corporate and government archives were open that an evaluation of the full impact of 
these government policies would be possible. However, there will never be complete 
and open access to all the relevant archives, historians will never know the full impact 
of these policies. Nevertheless, consideration of the archival material that is available 
does help us to understand the impact of the policies better. 
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